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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20000541-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction Attempted 
Unlawful Possession/Use of a Controlled Substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(Supp. 2000), and Unlawful Possession/Use of a Controlled 
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). See Addendum A (Judgment 
and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
sentencing Appellant in absentia in violation of his due process 
rights? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court errs in sentencing 
a defendant in absentia presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 
1996). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Anthony James Wanosik's ("Mr. Wanosik") objection 
to the trial court's sentencing in absentia is preserved on the 
record for appeal ("R.") at 54[3-4]. 
RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a)(2) (2000) - The Trial: 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel. The 
defendant shall be personally present at the trial with 
the following exceptions: . . . (2) In prosecutions for 
offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the 
case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had 
been present. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) (2000) - Sentence, 
Judgment and Commitment: 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or 
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the 
court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise 
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the 
defendant or may continue or alter bail or 
recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford 
the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or 
to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given 
an opportunity to present any information material to 
the imposition of sentence. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(b) (2000) - Sentence, 
Judgment and Commitment: 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried 
in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be 
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails 
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to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's 
arrest may be issued by the court. 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
tria by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Mr. Wanosik was charged by information with one count of 
unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); one 
count of unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); and one count of unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998). R.5-6 (Information). An arrest 
warrant issued. R.l. 
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On April 11, 2000, Mr. Wanosik pled guilty to attempted 
unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-3~7-8(2) (a) (i), and 
unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 
before Judge Atherton. R.18-24 (Guilty Plea); 27-28 (Minute 
Entry); 53 (Plea Colloquy). Sentencing was set for May 26, 2000, 
at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Frederick. R.28. 
Mr. Wanosik1s legal defender was present at the sentencing. 
R.29,54. However, Mr. Wanosik himself failed to appear. R.29, 
30, 54[2]. The court sentenced Mr. Wanosik in absentia. R.30, 
54[3]. The court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on June 14, 2000. R.34-36. 
Mr. Wanosik appeals from the trial court's sentencing in 
absentia. R.39. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Wanosik was observed by a Salt Lake police officer as he 
rummaged through donated items left at a Deseret Industries 
store, and then pick up something and place it in his pocket. 
R.6. The officer stopped Mr. Wanosik for theft. Id. A computer 
check revealed an outstanding warrant, and Mr. Wanosik was 
arrested. Id. During a search incident to arrest, the officer 
found a gas torch nozzle in Mr. Wanosik's pocket. Id. Mr. 
Wanosik stated that he found it at Deseret Industries. Id. A 
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continued search revealed small containers containing 
methamphetamine. Id. Mr. Wanosik then stated that he had two 
pipes in his pockets. Id. The officer also found five knives in 
Mr. Wanosik1s pockets. R.7. At the jail, two more bags of 
methamphetamine and a bag of marijuana were found on Mr. Wanosik. 
Id. 
Based on this evidence, Mr. Wanosik pled guilty to class A 
attempted unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance and 
class B unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance before 
Judge Atherton. R.18-24 (Guilty Plea); 27-28 (Minute Entry); 53 
(Plea Colloquy). At the plea hearing, he was ordered to report 
to AP&P for a PSR. R.27-28, 53[7]. He was also informed that 
sentencing was set for May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m. before Judge 
Frederick. Id. Mr. Wanosik was never informed that he could be 
sentenced in absentia. See generally R.53 (Plea Hearing). 
Mr. Wanosik reported to AP&P as required, and the PSR report 
was completed. R.52. AP&P recommended that he be sentenced to 
20 days in jail with credit for time served and then committed to 
a substance abuse treatment program. R.52[ll]. 
The sentencing hearing was duly held on May 26, 2000. R.29-
30, 54. Mr. Wanosik's attorney was present. R.29-30, 54. 
However, Mr. Wanosik was not present. R.29-30, 35 (Findings of 
Fact), 54[2]. Mr. Wanosik did not appear at any time during the 
morning calendar. R.35. Defense counsel explained that Mr. 
Wanosik probably had the wrong date, and was intending to appear, 
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given that he followed through with the order to report to AP&P 
for the preparation of the PSR. R.54[2]. She also noted that 
Mr. Wanosik had no reason to avoid sentencing because the PSR 
gave a favorable sentencing recommendation, which included 20 
days in jail and commitment to a substance abuse program,. Id. 
Accordingly, she asked the court to wait before issuing an arrest 
warrant to give her time to locate him. Id. 
The court issued an arrest warrant on account of Mr. 
Wanosik1s failure to appear. R.31-32 (Arrest Warrant); 54[2-3]. 
It proceeded with sentencing over defense counsel's objection. 
R.29-30, 54[3-4]. The judge concluded that Mr. Wanosik 
"voluntarily absent [ed] himself from these proceedings'7 since he 
did not contact the court or his attorney. R.54[3]. Contrary to 
AP&Pfs recommendation, the judge sentenced Mr. Wanosik to 
concurrent maximum jail terms of one year for the class A 
misdemeanor and six months for the class B misdemeanor. R.29-30, 
54[3]. The court informed defense counsel that Mr. Wanosik may 
have a rehearing if he showed up before being arrested. R.54[3]. 
Mr. Wanosik has not been arrested on this warrant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated due process and Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 22 (2000) when it sentenced Mr. Wanosik in 
absentia to the maximum sentence without giving any party the 
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and 
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without basing the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable 
information. Moreover, the error was harmful since the record 
shows that Mr. Wanosik would have been a candidate for probation 
had the judge conducted a full sentencing hearing and based the 
sentencing determination on relevant and reliable information. 
The trial judge further violated due process, the Article I, 
Section 12 right to appear and defend, and Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22 and abused his discretion in sentencing Mr. Wanosik 
in absentia. Mr. Wanosik was never informed that sentencing 
would proceed if he were not present. He therefore did not 
knowingly waive the right to presence. In addition, the judge 
did not fully consider whether the public interest required that 
Mr. Wanosik be sentenced in absentia. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN 
IT SENTENCED MR. WANOSIK WITHOUT BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT 
FROM EITHER DEFENSE COUNSEL OR THE PROSECUTOR, AND IN 
MR. WANOSIK'S ABSENCE. 
Judge Frederick erred as a matter of law in sentencing Mr. 
Wanosik in absentia. R.54[2-4]; see State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1108 (Utah 1996). The judge did so over defense counsel's 
objection and without any input material to sentencing from 
either defense counsel or the prosecutor. See generally R.54. 
The following colloquy transpired between defense counsel 
and Judge Frederick: 
Defense Counsel (Andrea Garland): Your Honor, . . . 
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I've looked for [Mr. Wanosik] but I've not been able to 
find him, your Honor. He did obtain his pre-sentence 
report. 
Court: Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom? (No 
response). Yes, let's discuss that matter. . . . Ms. 
Garland, you're appearing in his behalf? 
Defense Counsel: I am, your Honor. I think given that 
he did go and obtain his pre-sentence report he was 
intending to show up today, and so I would ask that you 
hold on to any warrants and give me a chance to find 
him. I believe he may have simply written down the 
wrong date. 
Court: Well -
Defense Counsel: I believe that, Judge, because this is 
a fairly favorable pre-sentence report, so he would 
have had no reason to try and avoid court today, it 
would -
Court: Presumably. 
Defense Counsel: Yes, it would have been in his best 
interest to appear. 
Court: I think in the meantime, counsel, given his 
failure to appear I will terminate his pre-trial 
release, issue a warrant for his arrest returnable 
forthwith no bail. My inclination is to sentence him 
today, and I recognize you would prefer that I did not, 
but I am inclined to do so. It is curious that he has 
failed to appear today, although I can only assume 
because he has not been in touch with you nor has he 
been in touch with my court that he has chosen to 
voluntarily absent himself from these proceedings. 
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of 
this Court that he serve the term provided by law in 
the adult detention center of one year for the class A 
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, and six months for the possession 
of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor charge to 
which he has pled guilty. I will order that those 
terms be served concurrently and not consecutively, and 
that they be imposed forthwith. 
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you 
or shows up before he's arrested, then you may approach 
me, but in the meantime, Mr. D'Alesandro, you prepare 
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the findings of fact [and] conclusions of law and order 
determining voluntary absent compliance, and that will 
be the order. 
Defense Counsel: Judge, I would object to that order 
because I don't think that it takes into account his 
due process rights or his rights about -
Court: Right. 
Defense Counsel: However, I realize thatfs your order. 
Court: Your objection is noted. 
R.54[2-4]. 
A. The Trial Court Violated Due Process and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22 When it Sentenced Mr. Wanosik Without 
Considering Relevant and Reliable Information and 
Without Affording Defense Counsel or the Prosecutor the 
Opportunity to Speak at Sentencing. 
The state and federal due process clauses vvrequire[] that a 
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." 
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); see also State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah) (state and federal due 
process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge 
make sentencing decision based on reliable and relevant 
information), superceded by statute on other grounds State v. 
Trvba, 2000 UT App 230, 401 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; see also U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV (Due Process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (same). 
A sentence which is not based on reliable and relevant 
information must be vacated. See State v. Cesarez, 656 P.2d 
1005, 1009 (Utah 1982) (vacating sentence where defendant was not 
supplied with a copy of the pre-sentence report); Johnson, 856 
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P.2d at 1071-75 (vacating sentence based on unreliable hearsay 
report). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) (2000) effectuates the 
due process relevance and reliability requirements by requiring 
sentencing judges to give both the defense and the prosecution an 
opportunity to present any information which might be material to 
the sentence. The rule states in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or 
to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given 
an opportunity to present any information material to 
the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); see Howell, 707 p.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure 
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Rule 22(a)] directs trial 
courts to hear evidence from both the defendant and the 
prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed"). 
Allowing defense counsel in particular, who acts as advocate for 
the defendant, to make such a statement and provide such 
information furthers the due process requirement of a fair and 
reliable sentencing proceeding. See generally Cesarez, 656 P. 2d 
at 1007 ("[s] entencing is a critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel"). It also ensures that a defendant facing 
sentencing is afforded his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing. Id. ; see also U.S. Const. 
amend. VI (Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel). 
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Rule 22(a) also allows a defendant to make an allocution 
statement at sentencing. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 371 
(Utah 1993) (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)) (Durham, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (joined by Stewart, J., and Zimmerman, 
J., in the result); see also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to 
allocution at sentencing "is an inseparable part of the right to 
be present" guaranteed by Utah Const. Art. I, § 12). The right 
to allocution is defined as the "[f]ormality of court's inquiry 
of defendant as to . . . whether he would like to make a 
statement on his behalf and present any information in mitigation 
of sentence." Black's Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed. 1990). The 
right to allocution at sentencing is another safeguard of due 
process reliability and relevance guarantees because "there are 
times when a plea in mitigation can best be presented by the 
defendant: fThe most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak 
for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, 
speak for himself.1" 5 LeFave, Criminal Procedure § 26.4(g) at 
778 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 
305, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961)). 
In light of the foregoing, Judge Frederick erred as a matter 
of law in sentencing Mr. Wanosik to the maximum concurrent jail 
sentence for class A (one year) and B (six months) misdemeanor 
offenses to which he pled guilty. R.54[4]. First, the judge did 
not allow either defense counsel or the prosecutor "an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition 
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of sentence" in violation of Rule 22(a). Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
The only remarks made by defense counsel concerned Mr. Wanosik!s 
absence, but nothing regarding the factors in mitigation of 
sentencing. See generally R.54[2-4]. The prosecutor was not 
afforded any opportunity to speak to sentencing. Id. 
Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Judge 
Frederick considered the PSR, which recommends a drastically 
different sentence than the maximum jail sentence imposed by the 
judge: 20 days in jail, with credit for time served, plus 
completion of a substance abuse program. R.52 (PSR - Agency 
Recommendation); 54 [2-4]. The judge does not make a single 
mention of the PSR throughout the sentencing hearing, or in the 
written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and accompanying 
order. R.34-38 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order) 
(Addendum B); 54 [2-4]. Indeed, the record is silent as to any 
relevant factual basis justifying the imposition of the sentence 
in this case other than Mr. Wanosik's absence. Id. Such a 
paucity of information does not satisfy the relevance and 
reliability standards required by Rule 22(a) and due process at 
sentencing. See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118; Johnson, 856 P.2d at 
1071; U.S. Const, amend. XIV (Due Process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 
7 (same). 
In addition, the court did not satisfy such standards where 
Mr. Wanosik personally was not present to argue factors in 
mitigation of his sentence. See Young, 853 P.2d at 371 
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(defendant's right to allocution guaranteed under Rule 22(a)); 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to allocution at sentencing is 
"inseparable part of the right to be present" guaranteed by Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 12). In Mr. Wanosik!s absence and without his 
personal input, the trial court further lacked the indicia of 
reliability and relevance required by due process to the extent 
that it did not receive his unique, and possibly more persuasive 
argument, for a mitigated sentence. See Green, 365 U.S. at 305 
("[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a 
defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak 
for himself"); see also Young, 853 P.2d at 371; Anderson, 929 
P.2d at 1111-12; U.S. Const, amend. XIV (Due Process); Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7 (same); Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
In short, the trial court violated Rule 22(a) and state and 
federal due process where it sentenced Mr. Wanosik without 
benefit of any material input to sentencing from the defense or 
prosecution; where the record does not establish that the court 
referenced the PSR in any way, or otherwise set forth a relevant 
evidentiary basis for the maximum jail sentence; and where Mr. 
Wanosik was not personally present to present an allocution 
statement. Accordingly, the court erred as a matter of law. 
B. The Trial Court Violated Due Process and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22 by Sentencing Mr. Wanosik in Absentia Where 
the Record Does Not Establish That He Knowingly and 
Voluntarily Waived His Right to Be Present and Defend 
at Sentencing. 
In addition to failing to comply with Rule 22(a) and due 
13 
process in conducting the sentencing hearing without input from 
the parties, Judge Frederick also violated due process and Rule 
22 when he sentenced Mr. Wanosik in absentia. Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 22(b) states, XN[o]n the same grounds that a 
defendant may be tried m defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant 
fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest 
may be issued by the court/' Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
17(a)(2) outlines the grounds for trial in a defendant's absence. 
It states in pertinent part: 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, 
the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after 
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not 
prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as 
if defendant had been present [.] 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (a) (2) . 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to this case 
through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, guarantee 
the right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 
1109-10; United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. 
1969). Any waiver of this right to be present "must be voluntary 
and involve an intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110 (citation omitted). The burden is on 
the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and voluntary waiver 
may not be presumed by the trial court. See State v. Houtz, 714 
14 
P.2d 677, 678-79 (Utah 1986). 
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to be 
present at sentencing, the defendant must be given notice of the 
proceedings. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. In addition, the 
directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning 
that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not 
present for a knowing waiver of the right to presence to occur. 
See McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1129-30. 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that sentencing the 
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to 
allocution where the defendant was informed of the trial date and 
signed a written waiver of his right to be present at trial, then 
had no further contact with trial counsel and failed to appear at 
trial and sentencing. 929 P.2d at 1110-11. The Court recognized 
that the right to allocution at sentencing "is an inseparable 
part of the right to be present" found in Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 1111. Anderson waived that 
right to allocution by his voluntary absence after being informed 
of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his right 
to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to 
keep in touch with defense counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. 
at 1110-11. 
The Utah Supreme Court relied on McPherson in reaching its 
conclusion that Anderson waived his right to be present. See 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. In McPherson, the D.C. Court of 
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Appeals focused on the nature of the communication with the 
defendant in determining whether he knowingly waived his right to 
be present at trial. See 421 F.2d at 1129-30. The focus in 
determining waiver, then, is on whether the record demonstrates 
that the defendant knew that the hearing would proceed in his 
absence. Id. The trial judge in McPherson made it clear that 
the defendant was to be present. Id. at 1130. The McPherson 
court reasoned that although the defendant knew that serious 
consequences could occur if he did not appear, the record failed 
to demonstrate that he knew that the trial would proceed in his 
absence if he were not present, and therefore failed to establish 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence. Id. 
The focus in McPherson on whether the defendant knew the 
hearing would proceed regardless of whether he was present is 
consistent with Anderson, where the defendant knew that the trial 
would proceed without him since he "executed a written waiver of 
his right to be present." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. It is 
also consistent with other Utah case law which does not directly 
address the issue of whether a knowing waiver occurs when the 
defendant is not informed that the hearing will proceed in his 
absence. See, e.g., State v. Waastaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-91 
(Utah App. 1989)(considering only whether the defendant's absence 
at trial was voluntary, and not analyzing whether a knowing 
waiver occurs where the record does not demonstrate that the 
defendant knew the hearing would proceed without him if he did 
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not appear); State v. Myers, 508 P.2d 41, 42-43 (Utah 1973) 
(same). 
In the present case, Mr. Wanosik was informed of the 
sentencing date by Judge Atherton during the plea hearing. 
R.53[7]. The record does not demonstrate, however, that he was 
ever informed that sentencing would proceed in his absence if he 
did not appear at sentencing. See generally R.53. The serious 
consequences that Mr. Wanosik faced could include an issuance of 
a bench warrant, see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b), or sentencing far in 
excess of the 20 days jail time and mandatory substance abuse 
treatment program recommended in the PSR without benefit of any 
input from him personally. The lack of any colloquy with Mr. 
Wanosik regarding these serious consequences does not satisfy the 
requirement that he be adequately informed about the possibility 
of sentencing in absentia. See McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130. 
Thus, the record fails to establish a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the due process and Article I, Section 12 right to be 
present at sentencing. 
Anderson indicated that "[p]ractical considerations also 
mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing" in that case. 
929 P.2d at 1111. The Court's concern was that the defendant 
could absent himself for years "and the eventual sentencing would 
have to be performed by a judge who was unfamiliar with the case 
and had no access to the relevant information." Id. In this 
case, Judge Frederick did not preside over the plea hearing, 
i 
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R.54; another judge, Judge Atherton, accepted the plea R.53. 
Hence, Judge Frederick was not: privy to the information presented 
at the plea hearing which might have been relevant to sentencing. 
Moreover, to the extent that he did not allow any party to 
present evidence material to sentencing at the sentencing 
hearing, his sentencing decision was not informed by such 
information either. Consequently, a concern that Mr. Wanosik 
would eventually be sentenced by a judge who knew nothing about 
the case is nonsensical in this situation where the actual 
sentencing was conducted by a judge who had not taken the plea 
and knew very little about the case. 
Moreover, any concern about dilatory defendants who are 
attempting to delay the administration of justice by failing to 
appear at a hearing is remedied by requiring trial judges to 
exercise their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing 
"the public interest in proceeding" without the defendant against 
the defendant's interests in being present. See. Smith v. Mann, 
173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 200, 145 
L.Ed.2d 168; see also United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 36-
37 (2d Cir. 1989) (court considers not only whether waiver of 
right to presence was knowing and voluntary, but also whether 
trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the public 
interest in proceeding without the defendant outweighed the 
defendant's interest in being present); People v. Parker, 57 N.Y. 
2d 136, 140-42, 440 N.E.2d 131 (1982) ("trial court must exercise 
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its sound discretion upon consideration of all appropriate 
factors''). Requiring trial courts to balance the public interest 
in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present 
ensures that the trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to 
presence. Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37. The factors to be 
considered when balancing such interests include "the possibility 
that [the] defendant could be located within a reasonable period 
of time," the difficulty of rescheduling, and the burden on the 
state in not proceeding. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142; see also 
Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Mr. "Wanosik in absentia where the record fails to 
demonstrate that the public interest in proceeding outweighed Mr. 
Wanosik's interest in being present. Mr. Wanosik has been 
married 24 years to his wife; they have three children together, 
ages 21, 20 and 13. R.52[5]. He currently holds down a full 
time job that he has had since 1990. R.52[8]. He has also 
worked other jobs for significant periods of time, including 11 
years as a janitor at a Salt Lake school. Id. With such a 
stable marital and work history, there is a good likelihood that 
Mr. Wanosik could be "located within a reasonable period of time" 
had the judge continued sentencing. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142. 
Moreover, AP&P recommended a sentence of 20 days in jail 
plus substance abuse treatment for Mr. Wanosik. R.52 (PSR Agency 
Recommendation). Mr. Wanosik himself admitted in the PSR that 
19 
drug abuse counseling "wouldn't hurt." R.52[7]. The combination 
of the favorable sentencing recommendation, plus his willingness 
to participate in treatment, further indicates that he would be 
available "within a reasonable period of time" if sentencing was 
continued since it would be to his advantage to do so. Parker, 
57 N.Y.2d at 142. Indeed, the fact that he did not appear for 
sentencing suggests that he likely had the wrong date because he 
had no incentive to avoid such a favorable sentencing 
recommendation.1 
As a final matter, the sentencing hearing in all likelihood 
could have been rescheduled easily. See Parker. 57 N.Y.2d at 
142; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37. Sentencing hearings do not 
require much time. The sentencing judge has regular calendars 
for sentencings and could include one more hearing on such a 
calendar. In addition, since neither the State nor the Defense 
presented any information in regard to sentencing, a delay in 
AP&P's favorable recommendation also alleviates any 
concerns that Frederick might have that Mr. Wanosik could not be 
located within a reasonable time based on a 1995 retail theft 
conviction for which a warrant issued six times. R.52[4]. 
AP&P's recommendation is an implicit recognition that he is ready 
and willing to go to counseling to the extent that the conviction 
and six warrants occurred a long time ago; he did not accrue any 
other charges until this present conviction, and no others are 
pending, Id.; Mr. Wanosik has otherwise conducted his life 
responsibly; he has a very limited adult criminal record and no 
juvenile record; and any involvement he has had with the criminal 
justice system is a result of his "minimal" drug abuse history. 
R.52[9]. Accordingly, the public interest in sentencing Mr. 
Wanosik in absentia is not outweighed by his interest his right 
to be present. See Mann, 173 F.3d at 76; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 
37; Parker, 57 N.Y. 2d at 140-42. 
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sentencing would not burden the State or create the risk that 
information would be lost. See Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142; 
Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37. Since the public interest did not 
require immediate sentencing in this case, Mr. Wanosik's interest 
in being present outweighed any public interest in proceeding. 
See Mann, 173 F.3d at 76; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37; Parker, 57 
N.Y. 2d at 140-42. The trial judge, therefore, abused his 
discretion in sentencing Mr. Wanosik in absentia. See Mann, 173 
F.3d at 76; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37; Parker, 57 N.Y. 2d at 140-
42. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Anthony James Wanosik respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case 
fora full and fair sentencing proceeding. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I Pit day of October, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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AI ITF rOT""'r ""AMES WANOSIK, 
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Custody . ba";:: Lake County 
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•Judge: J DENNIS FREDERICK 
Ha tie: May 26, 2 000 
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Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: DALESANDRO, NICK 
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Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 21 , 1950 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: iw:29-lx 
CHARGES 
1 .
 A T T E M P T E D ILLEGAL KjJbo/n HTiOLiihD oifbJTANi'I i irnnnn^n i -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2000 Guilty Plea 
2 ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL . . 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 6 month(s) 
Commitment. oeu...,, .mmediately. 
Pa 
Case No: 001905943 
Date: May 26, 2000 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Credit for 8 days time served. *Based upon defendant's failure to 
appear, the Court finds that he voluntarily absented himself from 
the sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in 
absentia. Counsel for State to prepare the findings.* 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Jail terms to run concurrently. 
Defendant's pre-trial service release is revoked and the Court 
orders that a non-bailable bench warrant issue for the defendant 
returnable forthwith. *.. 
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ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
FIUB PffTRJCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 4 201 
TM THF TH IP I) DISTRICT 'OUPT SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
TH1- STVO III HI All 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No MHWSWr.S 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The imposition of sentencing in the above-entitled matter came on foi hearing 
b d o i ' i Mi i iiiiiil n I Li1, '"in ' l i nn , iHin a mi i , i i l ,mil, Sa l t L a k e L e g a l D e f e n d e r 
Association, was present representing the defendant. Plaintiff, State of Utah, was 
r e p r e s e n t e d n» hi I in i i iim iiiiiiiiiii m pin j i i i i i n i w i n i m m ii it'inLiim M i n i m i s L i m e s 
Wanosik was not present. 
Based on the record in the above-enti . g 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was charged by Information with Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, for acts alleged to have occurred on March 27, 2000, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
2. On April 11, 2000, before the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, defendant 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered pleas of guilty to Attempted 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
3. Judge Atherton dismissed a charge of Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia based on a plea negotiation. 
3. Defendant was represented at all times during the entry of his guilty pleas 
by Andrea Garland, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. 
4. Following the entry of the defendant's guilty pleas on April 11, 2000, 
defendant was informed that sentencing was scheduled before this Court on May 26, 
2000, at 8:30 a.m. 
5. Defendant was not present as scheduled before this Court on May 26, 
2000, and did not appear at any time during the morning criminal calendar. 
6. Defendant's counsel, Andrea Garland, could not explain to the Court why 
her client was not present. 
7. Defendant did not contact the Court before or during the sentencing to 
explain his absence. 
8 without valid excuse, absented himself from 
the Court on May 26,2000. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 A defendant may be sentenced m .il^ciilu a.-, n i Inl l>, Rules 17(a)(2) 
J iii! ?? of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. Defendant waived his right to be present tt>f hi si'iHui. uti i M*1 .''>, 
nformed of the date and was voluntarily absent form the 
proceedings. 
DATED this £th day 01 
Approved as to form: 
Jnd^Sb^ 
Andrea Garland , 
Attorney for Defendant 
BY TfeE COURT: 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
FILMIBISTRJCT C8VBT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN t 4 2001 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 001905943FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court having reviewed the record and the law, having made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and being fully advised of the premises, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendant be sentencejHn absentia on May 26, 2000. 
DATED this f f -day of JJl 
J ' v. • ~
 r ^ . 
^r Judge 
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I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Proposed Fin lings • : f 
hid "I iHnilJ iii in Ml I .in1 IIIH Proposed Order were placed in the courier box, for 
delivery to Andrea Garland, attorney for defendant ANTHONY JAJVtEb 
East 'he 5th day of June, 2000. 
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